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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Accidents are the fourth leadinq cause of death in
the United States, following heart disease, cancer, and
stroke (National Safety Council, 1984).

Occupational

accidents have been decreasing over the years, but
currently they are still a significant concern of
industry.

A 1984 census report (National Safety Council,

1985) stated that accidental deaths in the United States
related to work totalled 1,900,000.

For 1983, the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
estimates that 5.4 work-related deaths occurred per
100,000 United States employees.

According to the

aforementioned census, United States accidents cost
industry $33.4 billion in 1984 (36% of the total national
accident cost) due to wage loss, medical expenses,
insurance administration costs, fire loss, and indirect
costs arising out of the work accidents.
Industrial occupations such as mininq, steel and
machinery manufacturing, railroading, etc., have systemic
control systems run by safety committees, engineers, and
1
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technological experts that focus on the physical hazards
in the work environment.

These systems operate in

conjunction with federal, state, local, industrial, and
OSHA regulations and standards (Kantowitz & Sorkin,
1983).

A large percentage of occupational accidents are

the result of human error rather than environmental
hazard.

Systemic control systems are not as effective as

they could be since they do not deal with the human error
component of accidents.
Considering the large percentage of accidents caused
by human error, it is surprising to find that research on
the psychosocial variables contributing to occupational
accidents has been somewhat neglected.

If the variables

that contribute to human error are determined, a means of
predicting human error and hence accidents can be
established.

This study will provide an organized

descriptive theory of the psychosocial risk factors that
lead to occupational accidents.
The study will have practical value as well in
diagnosing safety problems and thus aiding in the
development of control procedures to reduce losses.
Management and the work force of industry can benefit
immensely by the saving of lives and money and the
lessening of human injuries.

Once the significant

contributors to accidents are established for several
industries, future research can attempt to generalize the
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results to other industries.

In the very long run,

research can attempt to apply this knowledge to accidents
in non-occupational settings such as traffic, the home,
and public situations.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into
four chapters.

Chapt~r

II is a synthesis of the relevant

literature in the area of psychosocial variables in
occupational accidents.

A discussion of the existing

research on the relationship of physical hazards,
demographics, safety management, stress and anxiety, and
perceived control to accidents is included.

The chapter

concludes with the proposal of an integrative model of
the variables leading to accidents.
Chapter III describes the methodology used in the
study to test the proposed model.

The aspects of the

methodology included in this chapter are:

independent

and dependent variables investigated, respondents used,
instrument used, procedure followed, and analysis
conducted.
Chapter IV reports the findings of the statistical
analyses used in the study.

Results of the factor

analysis, reliability analysis, correlations between
survey variables, correlations between survey variables
and accidents, path analysis, overall regressions, and
cross-validations are included in this report.
The final chapter begins with a discussion of the

4

findings, their support of the model, and their
theoretical relevance.
discussed subsequently.

The limitations of the study are
The chapter concludes with

sections on the practical implications of the study and
suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter concentrates on a review of the
literature of the psychosocial variables related to
occupational accidents.
five major sections:

The variables are categorized in

physical hazards and danger level,

demographics, safety management, stress and anxiety, and
perceived control.

The chapter ends with an elaboration

of a proposed path model which describes how each
variable relates to occupational accidents.
Several relevant books on the subject of
psychosocial variables related to accidents were located
through the card catalog.

computer searches were

conducted through Psychological Abstracts, Social Science
Contents, Social Science Abstracts, Index Medicus,
Engineering Contents, and National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Reports with the
following terms:

occupational accidents, injuries, and

deaths with stress, anxiety, manufacturing, safety , and
health.

Investigation of this literature revealed a

hodgepodge of studies focusing on only one or two
5
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variables and no studies were found which attempted to
integrate findings from the various disciplines into an
integrative theory.

Combining the variables from each of

the studies resulted in a list of predictive variables.
These variables fell into five general categories and are
detailed in the following sections.
Physical Hazards/Danger Level
A rather obvious finding is that physical hazards
(e.g., falling rock, fires, broken tools, etc.)
contribute to the accident rate.

Human error alone is

not enough to cause an accident.

There must be some

physical hazard present for an injury to occur.

The

degree to which physical hazards contribute to accidents
depends, of course, on the severity of these hazards.
Blignaut (1979) reports that in examining accident
records of a South African mine, 40% of the accidents
were caused by pure physical hazard, particularly falling
rock.

Sixty percent of these accidents, however, were

caused primarily by human error, specifically inaccurate
hazard perception.

In these cases, the accident could

have been avoided if the miner had perceived a warning
and took corrective action.

Lawrence (1974) also found

that 60% of gold mining accidents were due to human error
(e.g., missing a warning, forgetting a safety rule) and
40% were caused by pure physical hazard which the miner
could not avoid.

7

Other hazardous occupations, such as primary steel
manufacturing (processing iron ore to steel) and airline
piloting have fewer physical hazards to deal with and
thus more of their accidents are primarily caused by
human error.

Mccarron and Haakenson (1979) in their

study of airline piloting, report that accidents are
caused by human error in 80% of the cases; 20% are caused
by pure physical hazards.

The same percentages have been

reported for primary steel manufacturers (Guastello,
Ikeda, & Connors, 1985).
In summary, accidents are due largely to human error
but a certain amount of hazard is necessary for an
accident to occur.

A measure of hazard is essential for

any complete model of the accident process.
Demographics
Another rather obvious finding is that the major
white-collar occupational groups generally have lower
work-injury rates than their blue-collar counterparts,
according to information from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (National Safety Council, 1982).

Using 1978

data from 25 states, the Bureau found that blue-collar
workers comprised 48% of the employment population yet
accounted for 77% of injuries compared to white-collar
workers who made up 30% of the employment population yet
only 8% of work injuries.

This phenomenon is largely due

to the fact that a greater degree of physical hazard
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exists in blue-collar jobs than in white-collar jobs.
Jsize of the work group an individual belongs to has
been shown to relate to accidents.

In a review article,

Revans (1958) reported three studies which found a
negative relationship, two a curvilinear relationship,
and one a positive relationship between group size and
accident rate.

Conway et al.

(1981) reported that

accidents decrease as age, years of experience doing
similar work, and seniority with the company increase.
Females are

reporte~

to have fewer accidents than males.
Safety Management

Several attributes of safety program management have
been found to discriminate between manufacturing
organizations with high versus low accident rates (Smith,
Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1978; Zohar, 1980).
includes:

The list

perceived importance of safety training,

status of the safety officer, status of safety committee,
reward and punishment structure for safe and unsafe
conduct, availability and use of protective safety
equipment, and housekeeping behavior.

Also, it is

important to have appropriate role models of safety for
employees to observe, a general climate that endorses
safety, and a reinforcement program for appropriate
safety behavior.
Rather than simply presenting a group of tips for
safety managers, Zohar (1980) emphasized the idea of a
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climate for safety, where climate for safety can be
thought of as a special case of organizational climate.
The concept is not unfounded since earlier research on
many subgroups found that accidents, absenteeism,
turnover, job satisfaction and climate variables all vary
together across organizational subgroups (Knowles, 1975).
One purpose of the present research is to expand the
climate concept beyond safety management issues only, to
include other objective (i.e., physical hazard) and
affective (i.e., stress, anxiety, and

J~cus

of control)

concepts as well.
Controlling the pace at which employees need to work
to keep up with production quotas is another important
characteristic of a good safety management program.
Chiles (1982) found that job overload, which causes
employees to work under time pressures, results in
errors.

Effectively managing task pace should reduce

errors, thus decreasing the accident rate.
stress and Anxiety ·
Stressors may be organized into two categories:
those that are physical in origin, and those that are
social in origin.
Physical Stress.

The relationship of physical

stressors (such as heat, cold, noise, toxins, dust, lack
of light, and crowdedness) to errors has been widely
researched (Cohen, 1980) and shown to negatively affect

10

performance on certain tasks.

Excess noise has been

shown to inhibit task performance (Glass & Singer, 1972;
Zimmer & Brachulis, 1978) as well as increase accident
rates (Noweir, 1984; Wilkins & Action, 1982).
Performance on both physical and mental tasks has been
reported to be adversely affected by excessive heat
(Hancock, 1980) and prolonged exposure to cold
temperatures (Kantowitz & Sorkin, 1983).
Shiftwork has also been shown to be related to
performance.

The basic concept behind shiftwork research

is that shiftwork (i.e., any work other than the regular
6:00 a.m.- 2:00 p.m., 7:00 a.m.- 3:00 p.m.,

s:oo a.m.-

4.p.m., or 9:00 a.m.- 5:00 p.m hours, involving a second
shift, night shift, or rotating shifts) has a deleterious
effect on most people's performance (Guastello, 1982).
The unwanted effects on performance and well being have
been attributed to disturbance of circadian rhythms and
normal sleep patterns (Bell & Telman, 198Q; Borowsky &
Wall, 1983; Ribak et al., 1983).
Social Stress.

It has been demonstrated that

personal and social stressors predict physical illness.
Holmes and Rahe (1967) have developed a Life Events Scale
which includes a checklist of stressful events such as
the death of a relative, a divorce, etc.

An overall

score is obtained for any individual by adding the
specific stress values assigned to each individual item.
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Research has demonstrated that those individuals
receiving high scores are more likely to suffer an
illness in the next two years than those individuals
receiving low scores.

Levenson (1983) found through

post-accident interviews that those employees who had
accidents had been experiencing more life stressors
before the accident than those employees not involved in
accidents.
Fairly recent studies have shown that stressful
events may immediately precede automobile and domestic
accidents as well as industrial accidents (Whitlock,
Stoll , & Rekhdahl, 1977).

Brenner and Selzer (1969)

found that automobile drivers who experienced recent
social stress were five times more likely to cause fatal
accidents as drivers without such stress.
Anxiety.

Manifest anxiety as measured by the Taylor

Manifest Anxiety Scale (1953) is often indicative of
stress in a person's life -- either physical or social
stress.

The anxiety scale which was derived from the

Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI) is a collection
of medical symptoms which do not go together logically.
These symptoms could be precipitated by stressful events
or they could be a neurotic disorder independent of any
stressful events.

Persons experiencing many life

stressors and/or physical stressors but exhibiting little
anxiety may be "resistant to stress" (Zarzycka, 1982), a
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trait found to be a predictor of low accident rates.
Some associations have been made between anxiety and
accident rates..

Casualities in one automobile plant had

longer past histories of medical, surgical, and
psychiatric episodes (Allodi & Montgomery, 1979).
Hirschfeld and Behan (1963), in reviewing 300 cases of
industrial accidents leading to disability, emphasized
that accidents are part of a process in which both stress
and anxiety dominate the pre-accident setting, slow down
rec~very,

and prolong disability.

Japanese pilots who

were accident victims were found to be experiencing many
anxiety symptoms preceding the incident (Kakimoto, Katoh,
Nakabayashi, & Iwamoto, 1983).
The previously mentioned studies that examined
stress and anxiety levels before an accident are suspect
with regard to validity since subjects were studied after
an accident in order to determine their stress and
anxiety levels before the accident.

One cannot help but

wonder about the accuracy of this recall method.
Perceived Control
It has been established that uncontrollable physical
stressors such as noise, heat, and cr.owding lead to
/

(_greater error than controllable ones (Glass
1972).

&

Singer,

For example, if a person has the option of

turning down the heat, that person will experience less
stress (regardless of whether he or she actually turns
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the heat down) than the person who has no option other
than bearing it (Cohen, 1980).

Three theories have been

proposed to explain this phenomenon and they are
described as follows.
Adaptive-cost Hypothesis.

According to the

adaptive-cost hypothesis (Glass & Singer, 1972), the work
required to adapt to unpredictable and uncontrollable
stressors is substantially greater than that required to
adapt to predictable and controllable stimulation.
theory predicts that

p~~rer

The

performance on aftereffects

tasks should vary directly with the degree of adaptation,
since a greater degree of adaptation implies a greater
amount of adaptive effort.

Presumably, increased

adaptive effort would deplete one's available psychic
energies and would thus result in deficits on subsequent
demanding tasks.
Information Overload Hypothesis.

An alternative

form of a psychic cost hypothesis, the information
overload hypothesis, has been proposed by Cohen (1978).
He argued that unpredictable, uncontrollable stressors,
because they are potentially threatening, substantially
increase demands on attentional capacity.

This increased

demand might occur because individuals are required to
monitor threatening stimuli to decide how to respond, or
because effort is required to tune out distracting
stimuli.

Prolonged exposure to an environmental stressor
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and/or to a high information load should result in
cognitive fatigue -- an insufficient reserve of attention
to perform demanding tasks.
Learned Helplessness Theory.

Learned helplessness

theory was proposed by Seligman (1975) to explain the
locus of control concept.

He argued that subjects who

are unable to predict and control a stressor learn that
their reinforcements are independent of their responses,
which results in motivational decrements that are
manifested in poorer performance.

In other words,

individuals submit to negative consequences because their
experiences have demonstrated that any action to avoid
them is futile.
Locus of Control.

The personality trait of locus of

control (Rotter, 1966) involves the degree to which
individuals perceive that they have control over events
occurring in their lives.

According to the theory, an

individual with an external locus of control perceives
that circumstances, bad or good luck, other people, or
events are responsible for what occurs in life while an
individual with an internal locus of control perceives
that individuals are the makers of their own destinies
and responsible for their own fortunes or misfortunes •
.. Internality increases with age, and women in general are
more externally oriented according to the research
(Lefcourt, 1981).
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Locus of control has been shown to be a moderator of
stressful life events, life events having a more severe
impact on externals (Lefcourt, 1981).

Internals seem to

demonstrate a resistance to stress, the trait found by
zaraycka (1982) to be a predictor of accidents.

~

Internals are also reported to be more resistant to

~

illness and there is a consistent and statistically
significant finding that externals report more anxiety
than internals.

The impact of locus of control on

stressful occupational events is illustrated by a study
of manager's behavior after a flood (Anderson, 1977).
Internally oriented managers responded in a more
task-oriented way, demonstrating less stre'ss while
externals responded with anger, anxiety, and hostility.
Since stress and anxiety have been reported to
contribute to error and accidents, and locus of control
has been shown to moderate stress and anxiety, it follows
that locus of control is an important variable in errors
and accidents.

Only one study was found which focussed

on this relationship directly, finding no significant
difference in Rotter's locus of control scores between
two work groups with differing accident rates (Sims,
Graves, & Simpson, 1984).

However, the volunteer miners

used as subjects in this study were reported to be
significantly higher on internal locus of control
measures than a comparison sample of university students.
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stress and other related variables were not examined in
this study.

Since predictability and controllability

have been shown to be important aspects of physical
stressors and their relationship to error, it is likely
that locus of control will prove to be an important
moderator variable in the relationship of social stress
to error.
Proposed Model
The variables discussed in the previous section can
be combined to develop a model of the psychosocial
variables related to occupational accidents.

This

section includes a discussion of the direct and indirect
relationships proposed between safety management,
experience, danger level, physical hazards and stressors,
life stress, locus.of control, and anxiety with
occupational accidents.
The theoretical model presented in Figure 1
illustrates the proposed relationship between the
aforementioned variables.

The model combines the

findings from the literature into an integrative theory.
Research supports the propositions that physical hazards,
danger level, experience, safety management, and anxiety
affect accidents directly.

This study will attempt to

validate these findings.
Research also supports the proposition that stress,
anxiety, and locus of control are interrelated:

Stress

SAFETY

MANAGEMENT

EXPERIENCE
PHYSICAL STRESS

ACCIDENT
RATES

LIFE STRESS
/

LOCUS OF
CONTROL
DANGER LEVEL

PHYSICAL HAZARDS

.......

Figure

!•

Proposed model of the variables related to accidents.

.....]
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leads to anxiety and locus of control moderates the
amount of anxiety a person may feel in response to this
stress.

Stress and locus of control, then, are proposed

to relate to accidents only through their effect on
anxiety.
Studies on social stress and anxiety as they relate
to accidents are all post-dictive in nature.

The

procedure in these studies was to interview individuals
who were involved in accidents to determine their stress
and anxiety levels before the accident occurred.

This

study, however, will measure group levels of social
stress, anxiety and accidents concurrently in order to
develop an equation relating these variables to
accidents.
Perceived uncontrollability of physical stressors
has been shown to affect performance adversely.

As

suggested in the adaptive-cost hypothesis (Glass &
Singer, 1972), perhaps an individual's energy is drained
due to the greater adaptive effort necessary to maintain
the same performance level and so safety precautions
suffer.

As explained by the information overload

hypothesis (Cohen, 1980), perhaps an individual's channel
capacity becomes overloaded and secondary tasks such as
safety precautions suffer as a result of this overload.
Lastly, perhaps individuals learn that their
reinforcements are independent of their efforts and the
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motivation to attend to safety is diminished as suggested
by learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975).

This

study will investigate the effect of uncontrollable
physical stressors on accidents.

It is proposed that

physical and life stressors will affect accidents
indirectly by increasing anxiety.
Only one study has examined the direct relationship
between accidents and locus of control.

The literature

supports the hypothesis that locus of control moderates
the impact of stressful life events and physical
stressors on individuals.

Since anxiety leads to

accidents, the hypothesis that locus of control leads to
accidents through its effect on anxiety (i.e., by
moderating stress) will also be tested in this study.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

This chapter on methodology begins with a discussion
of the independent and dependent variables investigated
in the study.

Descriptions of the subjects and

instruments used in the study are given next.

The

chapter concludes with a discussion of the procedure
followed and analyses performed in the study.
Variables to be Investigated
Data was collected by a survey on the following
independent variables:

experience, safety management,

physical hazards, danger level, physical stressors,
social stressors, anxiety, and locus of control.
The dependent measure, group accident rates (number
of accidents per 100 man years) during January 1984 to
October 1985, was obtained from company accident reports
and validated by rates listed on the OSHA-200 forms.

A

company accident report describing the incident and the
apparent causes is completed each time an accident
occurs.

Monthly, information regarding types and number

of accidents is compiled onto the OSHA-200 form which is
20
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required by OSHA to keep record of each company's
accident history.

Accident rates on these forms were

calculated according to Occupational Safety and Health
Administration policy.

An accident is defined as

"something that is unplanned, uncontrolled, and in some
way undesirable; it disrupts the normal functions of a
person or persons and causes injury, death, or near
injury" (Anton, 1979).

Only those accidents caused at

least in part by human error are of interest in this
study since psychology is the focus of this research.

It

was found that all the accidents reported had some
component of human error.
Any errors in the reporting of accidents would of
course decrease the reliability of the dependent variable
thus affecting the statistical conclusion validity of the
study.

Since the reporting of accidents is an

established practice for the company and since accident
rates are obtained from two sources, the amount of error
in reporting should be small.
In this study, two different measures of accident
rates were collected:

(1) accident rate per 100 man

years for 1985 only and (2) accident rate per 100 man
years for 1984 and 1985 combined.
accident reporting is used by OSHA.

This system of
Both measurements of

the dependent variable were used in order to obtain a
subjective assessment of over how long a period of time
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accident data needs to be collected in order to achieve
reliable indicators.

Cohen and Cohen (1975) suggest that

rate data undergo log transformation before multiple
regressions are conducted upon it.

The log

transformation of rate data (which is non-linear)
linearizes the relationship between the independent
variables and accident rate thus capitalizing on the
analytic power of multiple regression.

Regular accident

rates and log of acccident rates were used in the study
for this reason.
There were a total of four versions of the dependent
variable:

accident rate for 1985, accident rate for 1984

and 1985 combined, base-10 logarithm of the accident rate
for 1985 , and base-10 logarithm of the accident rate for
1984 and 1985 combined.

Correlations between independent

variables and accidents were calculated using each of the
four versions of the dependent variable.

This was done

to determine whether or not log transformation would
enhance results, and whether data obtained over the most
recent six months or most recent one year period would be
a better predictor of accident rates.

It was found that

the log transformation greatly enhanced the predicted
relationships and that data collected during both the six
month and one year period provided useful information.
For these reasons, log of 1985 and log of 1984-1985
combined were used as dependent measures in all
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subsequent analyses.
Data on work group size was retrieved from company
records to further investigate the correlation between
group size and accidents since studies on this topic are
inconclusive.
Subjects
Subjects were the employees of nine small
manufacturing companies:

one Chicago area steel sheet

metal company, one Chicago area brass sheet metal
company, four Milwaukee area steel foundries, one
Milwaukee area brass foundry, one Rhode Island brass
sheet metal company, and one Racine aluminum and alloy
foundry.
overall, the return rate was 52%.

Return rates of

each company along with the number of work groups and
total number of workers in each company are listed in
Table 1.

A broad range of response rates was found among

the companies (30% to 82%).

Analyses of the effect of

response rate on the independent and dependent variables
revealed no significant effect.

Response rate was not

correlated with any of the variables used in the study.
However, the effect of a possible response bias
(nonrespondents differing from respondents) is
investigated in the discussion.
Job categories in the sample industries included
electrical and mechanical maintenance, trucking,
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Table l
Summary of Company Response Rates

Type !ll_ Company #Groups Subunit Size #Returned Percent
brass mill

3

22

11

50

brass mill

10

62

47

76

steel mill

12

90

74

82

steel foundry

9

125

51

41

steel foundry

11

167

109

65

steel foundry

7

62

22

36

steel foundry

9

146

53

36

brass foundry

9

84

42

50

aluminum foundry

9

86

26

30

79

854

335

52

Overall
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clerical, supervisory, operator, and general laborer.
The following two job definitions are included to
illustrate typical job duties of foundry and sheet metal
operators and laborers.
The foundry worker (United states Department of
Labor, 1965) performs any combination of the following
tasks:

melting metal, pouring metal into molds, removing

castings from molds, dressing castings, moving foundry
materials, and cleaning equipment and work areas.

The

foundry worker moves sand, castings, flasks or other
materials about the foundry by hand, using a wheel-barrow
or cart, or by loading them onto a conveyor.

Other

duties include watering and mixing sand, shoveling sand
into flasks, and compacting sand in flasks using a
ramming tool.

The foundry job involves spraying binder

on the surface of sand molds and drying the surface with
a blowtorch.
A slitting-machine operator (United States
Department of Labor, 1965) is one type of operator in the
sheet metal companies.

This type of operator sets up and

operates a slitting machine to cut sheet metal into
strips of specified width.

They select, clean, and

install spacers and cutters on arbors, and hone cutters
with oilstone to remove nicks.

Other duties include:

pressing buttons to lower the arbor until cutters mesh,
measuring clearance with a feeler gage, inserting spacers
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to adjust spacing to specified tolerance, threading
sheets through slitters and verifying dimensions of cut
to specifications using a rule.
A range of risk was sampled.

Both companies as a

whole and work groups within companies varied in their
accident rates so there was not a problem with inhibited
correlations due to restriction of range of accident
rates.

For the years of 1984 and 1985 combined, overall

company accident rates ranged from 84.5 accidents per 100
man years to 511.8.

Across all companies, work groups

ranged from a rate of
125.0.

o.o accidents per 100 man years to

There were a total of 79 work groups and 435

employees in the sample.

The majority of these subjects

were blue collar male, however, 12.2% of the sample were
females.
Instrument
The Employee Assessment of Occupational Hazards
survey (Guastella, 1984) was used in this study.

The

survey contained 75 items and took about 25 minutes to
complete.

Questions 1, 3, and 4, asked about experience:

age, years with the company, and years doing similar
work.

Responses were scaled from 3 to 12 with larger

values indicating an older, more experienced person.
Information obtained from items 2, 4, and 5 was used for
descriptive purposes only.
work area, and job category.

These items concerned:

sex,

The rest of the survey was
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arranged into three major sections:
hazard checklist.

safety, health, and

Response mode for the safety and

health questions was kept simple -- agree, do not know,
and disagree.

To respond to the hazard checklist, the

individual merely checked off yes or no depending on if
the hazard existed or not.
Safety items included questions on safety management
and locus of control.
Safety Management Questions.

Safety management

questions were as follows:
7.

The company safety program really does control
accidents.

a.

New employees are not properly trained for
safety in the work place.

9.

The company is concerned with safety in the
work place.

10.

My co-workers often fail to observe safe
procedures in the work place.

11.

The place I must work in is usually orderly
and tidy.

12.

In the place I work, there are usually things
all over the floor that people can trip on or
hurt themselves on.

13.

The company gives us all the safety equipment
we need to protect ourselves on the job.

14-.

There are no safety procedures for some of
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the hazards we must work with.
15.

People who follow safe procedures are
promoted more often than those who do not.

20.

When someone is performing a job unsafely,
the foreman shows that person how to do the
job properly.

21.

The foreman usually does not notice when
someone is performing a job unsafely.

22.

Management requires severe penalties for
persons who do not follow safe procedures.

23.

Some of this company's safety rules are
foolish.

24.

People who always follow safety rules are
just scared to work here.

25.

It is not possible to follow all the
safety rules if you want to keep up with
production.

Items 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 20, and 22 were scored as
follows:

agree=2, I don't know=l, and disagree=O.

The

"agree" response for these items was favorable to company
management, "I don't know" was neither favorable nor
unfavorable, and "disagree" was unfavorable.

Items 8,

10, 12, 14, 21, 23, 24, and 25 were scored as follows:
agree=O, I don't know=l, and disagree=O.

For these

items, the "agree" response was unfavorable to company
management, "I don't know" was again neither favorable
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nor unfavorable, and "disagree" was favorable.

The

subscale was scored 0-30 where larger values indicated
the relative adequacy of the companies' policies and
procedures.

These items were modeled after factors found

to discriminate between high and low risk groups in
studies of Zohar {1980) and Smith et al.(1978).
Locus of Control Questions.

The other safety items,

locus of control, were as follows:
26.

Accidents are caused by mistakes people make.

27.

Sometimes accidents just happen, and there is
nothing that can be done about it.

28.

Trusting in luck does not work to improve
safety.

29.

"Near-miss" accidents are not important, only
the ones that actually happened.

30.

I do not have much control over whether the
people I work with follow safe procedures.

31.

I feel I have been lucky with regard to
accidents.

32.

I feel I can always keep myself out of an
accident.

33.

Accidents have nothing to do with luck.

The responses for items 26, 28, 32, and 33 were
coded in the following manner:
and disagree=2.

agree=O, I don't know=l,

Internal locus of control individuals

were expected to answer "agree" to these items more
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often, while external locus of control individuals were
expected to answer "disagree." Items 27, 29, 30, and 31
were reverse scored so that internally controlled
respondents would tend to disagree while externally
controlled respondents would tend to agree.

The subscale

was scored 0-16 where resulting scores represented the
degree to which the employee was externally controlled
with respect to accidents.

After conducting a

reiiability analysis of this scale, item 26 was
elimin~.ted

from the scale (see Results).

The range of

scores was reduced from 0-16 to 0-14 as a result of this
procedure.
It should be mentioned that prior to including this
scale in the survey, a pilot test was conducted on the
scale using a sample of 184 students from a Midwestern
University (Guastello & Guastello, in press) •

This locus

of control scale was found to be significantly correlated
with the Rotter locus of control scale

(~.13,

R<.05).

However, this is less than 2% of shared variance.
Nevertheless, the scale was included due to the need for
a short scale with face validity (see Procedure) •

The

implications of this low correlation for the locus of
control construct are elaborated upon in the discussion.
Health questions consisted of:

(1) anxiety

questions from the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (1953);
and (2) the life stress checklist from the Holmes and
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Rahe (1967) scale.
Anxiety Questions.

Anxiety questions were as

follows:
36.

I am extremely tired when I get home from
work every day.

37.

I am often sick to my stomach.

38.

I am more nervous than other people I work
with.

39.

I have at least one bad headache a week.

40.

I work under

41.

I can feel my hands, arms, or legs shaking
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great deal of tension.

when I work.
42.

I have nightmares about my job.

43.

I do not sweat more than other people.

44.

Most people are more afraid of the job
hazards than I am.

45.

I am often hungry between meals.

46.

I do not have problems with diarrhea or
constipation.

47.

I am very sure of myself in new situations.

Items 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 45 were scored
as follows:

agree=2, I don't know=l, and disagree=O.

Higher anxiety individuals were expected to agree with
most of these items.

Higher anxiety respondents were

expected to disagree with items 43, 44, 46, and 47 which
were reverse scored.

The subscale was scored 0-22 ..

32

Higher values indicated higher anxiety.

After

reliability analyses were conducted, items 44 and 47 were
eliminated from the scale (details in Results).

Scoring

changed from 0-22 to 0-18 as a result of this procedure.
Life Stress Checklist.

Also included in the health

area of the survey was the life stress checklist which
included the following items:
48.

My wife/husband has died within the
last six months.

49.

A close family member (not husband or wife)
has died within the last six months.

50.

A close friend has died within the last
six months.

51.

I am in the process of obtaining a divorce.

52.

I feel my job security has improved in the
last six months.

53.

I have been given new job assignments
in the last six months.

54.

I am now making plans for retirement.

55.

My working hours have changed recently.

56.

Lately I have been sleeping less or
at different hours.

57.

I have been eating less regularly lately.

58.

Someone in my family has suffered a major
illness or injury.

Although the "I don't know" responses were not
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expected for items 48-51, the option was retained so that
the response format would be consistent.throughout the
scale.

The following coding scheme was used for all

items in the scale:
disagree=O.

agree=2, I don't know=l, and

Resulting scores ranged from 0-22 where

larger values indicated the presence of more stressful
life events than smaller values.
Questions about the working environment included
questions about the danger level of the environment and a
phy~ical

stressor and physical hazard checklist.

Danger Level.

Questions used to determine the level

of danger in the plant were as follows:
16.

There are no real hazards in my work area.

17.

People in my work place are often injured
enough to need help from the clinic.

18.

Accidents in my work place sometimes put
people out of work for a long time.

19.

People in my work place are sometimes
killed on the job.

34.

There are no real health hazards in my
work place.

35.

People in my work place are sometimes
sick due to health hazards on the job.

Responses to items 17, 18, 19, and 35 were coded as
follows:

agree=2, I don't know=l, and disagree=O.

16, and 34 were reverse scored.

The subscale scores

Items
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ranged from 0-12 where higher numbers indicated a more
dangerous work environment than lower numbers.
Stress and Hazard Checklist.

The stressor and

hazard checklists were derived from actual hazard reports
of various manufacturing companies.
for both checklists was yes/no.
"No" was coded as

o.

The response format

"Yes" was coded as 1 and

The physical stressors checklist

contained these items:

crowding with other people (item

60), work place too hot (item 64), work place too cold
(item 65), too much dust (item 66), toxic fumes (item
67), not enough light (item 71), intense noise (item 72),
and on an irregular shift (item 75).
The J:'esponse choice of "shift you are working"
varied with each company because companies had different
ways of dividing up the work day.

In any case, if an

individual worked the first shift he or she was assigned
a 1 and if he or she worked any other shift (including
rotating shift), he or she was assigned a O code.

This

code was· then added to the physical stress score.

Items

were scored

o-a

where higher numbers meant that more

stressors were present.
The physical hazard checklist consisted of the
following items:

walkways crowded with equipment (item

59), broken tools (item 61), trash in work space (item
62), missing safety devices (item 63), equipment not
properly stored (item 68), open fires (item 69),
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explosions (item 70), sometimes cannot hear warning
signals (item 73), and people who do not work here
walking through dangerous places (item 74).

Items were

scored from 0-9 where higher numbers meant that more
hazards were present in the work environment.
Procedure
The survey method was chosen because of its
suitability for the purposes of the study.

The survey

was administered on company time because this was the
easiest way to contact subjects and it helped to achieve
a response rate greater than one that would be achieved
by mail.

The companies had only two conditions for

administering the survey on company time.

First of all,

the length of the administration time could be only about
1/2 hour.

Secondly, the survey had to have face

validity.

Safety directors wanted to see that the

questions were related to accidents.

Safety managers

were not favorable to experimental designs due to the
time experiments take and due to their lack of face
validity (as perceived by non-researchers).
The surveying began in August.

The safety manager

of each company was responsible for administering the
survey to their employees.

The surveys were accompanied

by a cover letter from the experimenter although there
was phone communication prior to this.
covered the following key points:

The cover letter
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1.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this
research project.

2.

The goals of the project are to study psychological
variables that can greatly influence accident rates
and in this way to aid in the development of new
control strategies.

You will of course receive a

copy of all reports resulting from this research.
3.

No individual data can or will be exposed.

There

will be no ranking or rating of individuals since
this would be against union contract.
4.

Employee participation is voluntary but strongly
encouraged.

5.

Please instruct one employee in each work group to
collect surveys (folded over and stapled) and to
return them to the safety director who will mail them
to the researcher.
The safety director of each company was requested to

include copies of accident reports, OSHA-200 forms, and
work group sizes when returning the surveys.

All data

was returned by October.
Analyses
Factor Analysis.

A factor analysis was performed

using individual level data to determine the factor
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structure of the survey.

cronbach's alpha was calculated

to determine the reliability of each of the factors.
these analyses, n=435.

For

Eight factors as described under

the instrument section were expected (i.e., locus of
control, danger level, life stressors, physical
stressors, anxiety, safety management, physical hazards,
and experience).
Path Analysis.

Path analysis was the most

appropriate statistical technique for analyzing the data
in an attempt to validate the proposed model (Pedhazur,
1982).

It was important to use group accident rates as

the dependent variable since a person' s involvement in
an accident did not necessarily mean that the person
caused the accident.

Since group accident rates were

used, group means on the independent variables proposed
to directly relate to accident rate also had to be used
so that the levels of analyses were comparable.
The path analysis produced a path coefficient for
each proposed relationship between variables in the
model.

The analysis was basically comprised of two

multiple regressions.

The first used group level data to

predict accident rates from safety management, physical
hazards, danger level, experience, and anxiety.

The

second used individual level data to predict anxiety from
locus of control, physical stressors, and social
stressors.

Individual level data was more appropriate
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for variables such as anxiety, locus of control, and life
stress since differences in these variables were all
measured at the individual level.

Also, using individual

level data when possible, increased n from 79 to 435.
An overall multiple regression was also conducted

(using group level data for all eight variables) to
determine how each factor directly related to ·accidents.
2
The coefficient of determination, B , obtained from this
regression indicated the proportion of variance in
accident rates accounted for by the entire combination of
psychosocial variables.
A cross-validation (Cohen & Cohen, 1975) was
performed on the path analysis regression equations.
After analyses on the intact sample was completed, the
sample was divided into 2/3 and 1/3 parts.

The analyses

were then repeated on the larger part to obtain
regression weights.

These weights were then applied to

the smaller partial sample to obtain predicted values of
the dependent variables to correlate with the actual
values of the dependent variables.

These correlations

provided a measure of the accuracy of the original
weights.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

This chapter is a report of the results of the
analyses performed on the data obtained in the study.
The findings are discusser! in the following order:
factor analysis, reliability analysis, correlations
between survey variables, correlations of survey
variables with accidents, subunit size, path analysis,
overall regression, and cross-validation.
Factor Analysis
A factor analysis, using the principal axis method,
was performed on the survey variables.

The varimax

rotation converged in 31 iterations and 11 factors with
eigenvalues>.90 (see Table 2) were extracted.
criterion was set at 0.30.

Loading

It was hypothesized that each

of the eight scales on the survey would emerge as a
distinct factor in the analysis.

Results approximated

this expectation.
Factor 1, a messiness factor, was composed of four
physical hazards items (items 59,61,62, and 63) and two
safety management items (items 11, and 12).
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It appears
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Table 2
Factor Analysis of Survey Variable (Questions 1,3,4,7-75)

Ql
Q3
Q.4
a7
as
a9
au·
all
012
Cl 3
au
015
Ql6
Q17
Ql8
Ql9
02B
021
022
Q23
Q24
Q25
026
a27
Q28
029
03.0'
Q31
Q32
ll33
034
Q35
Q36
037

FACTOR

FACTOR

-II . .0'4232

-11./14198
. .0'1356
. .0'51182
-B . .05565
-B. 16185
-B.137.0'2
-B./18886
-B. 1.0792
-B.l.0'479
-B.12.0'56
-.0'./18916
-B.1384.0'
.115711
.24764
• .8'6139

-

. .046.0'3
.B.0467
-11.19512
-B.11653
-B.21294
-B.16286
-B.47.0'88
-B.54427
- B. 1 4 4.09
-B.18615
-.0" • .0'3.0'46
.1.4433
.167749
• .8'6858
.JJ9929
-11.-283.07
-B.25749
-B.11484
-B. 23655
-B.18665
-B.17431
-B • .0457.0'
./16667
-B • .0'2739
-B. lB.0'28
-II. 183.0'6
.14827
-B . .0'1433
-B .B.0786
.11926
.26433
• 1B52 l
• /181516

-B.11535B

-B.166.0'3
-B.18378
-B .1.0.083
-B • .0'5881
• .0392.0
-B. 188.0'1
-B.BB7B3

./123/13
./13594
. .0'9.0.0'2
-B.2.0883
• .0'7641
• .0'1655
-B . .01753
.22.072
.17423
.26584
.1B724

2

FACTOR
-B . .0'2351
• .0'7963
.B/1148

-B.11232
-.0'./15641
-B.12754
-B • .0'2145
-B • .0539.0'
-B.12957
-B . .05725
-B.12355
./12272
.113684
• .96631
.164917
.B1881
-16./11311
-B.Bl.089
-B./131.08
-.0' • .0'6.089
-B.13368
-B.2.0993
• .0'/1183
-B.117137

./11123
-B • .03693
.B.0'985
. .0'6456
-B.1.0.016
-B . .02548
.B8648
.2.0'.0'36
.52755
.58961

3

FACTOR

FACTOR

.76968
.7.0/166
-B . .0'3.049
-B./12.0'55
-B . .0'3556
-B . .0'7314
. .0'71.0'7
-B.B.0'367
. .0'3.0'6.0
. .0'2343
-B . .0'1889
-B.113813
./1388:'
./12987
• .95613
-.0' • .0'4591
-.0'.B7667
• .0'.0'149
• .0176/I
-B • .0'5496
-B • .0'1345
./16371
./19137
-.0' • .0'4328
. .02532
• .0'1977
.B2B78
-B • .04164
-B • .0'.0'831
-B • .0'3541
.11469
-11./13567
-B.B5432

. .0'3436
-B . .07731
. .04344
.45924
-B./12569
.63111
.12684
. 24327
. 22.0'33
.4719.0'
.24982
.12188
-B . .99295
-B. 111186
-8./138114
.JJ284B
.39728
.19563
.3.0'491
• 12377
• 18724
.16666
.31964
• .03837
• .0'2195
.B.0'148
.1787.0'
.B.0'4.0'1
.18967
-B . .0'1.0'38
-B • .07889
-.0' • .0'7134
-B. 14625
-B • .09588

"
• 74442

5
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Table 2

continued
FACTOR
Q38
Q39
Q4B
Q41
Q42
Q43

a.u

Q45
Q46
Q47
Q48
Q49
QS.0'
QSl
052
053
Q54
ass
a56
Q57
ass
Q59
Q6.0'
Q61
a62
Q63
Q64
Q65
066,
a67
068
Q69

0718
Q71
072
073
074
a75

1

• .0'6 9 4.0'
• .0'8848
.11561
•.0'7685
• .0'5136
-B • .0'1252
• .0'3427
• .0'7/J27
-11 • .0'5.0'82
-B • .0'3155
• .0'2569
• .0'.0'4 71
• .0'9246
• .0'4648
-11.13834
• .0'4363
• .0'.0'885
• .0'2535
• .0'6618
• .0'9612
.14524
• 6.0'539
.29.0'18
.43962
.59459
.34888
• 161.0'7
.24642
• 2.0'364
.2.0'679
.45422
.11181
• .09674
.19874
• .0'7933
• 191865
.23342
.B3163

EIGENVALUE

8.86139

PCT CF VAi\ 12.3

FACTOR

z

• .0'2983
• .0'2612
• .0'5162
.l.0'544
• .0'9793
-.0' • .0'.0'366
.1255.0'
.11147
• l.0'153
-.0' . .0'2.0'62
-.0' • .0'1347
-B • .0'.0'3.0'9
. .0'6172
• .0'7118
-B .16355
• .0'1786
-.0' • .0'5191
.l.0'112
• .0'2371
• .0'5126
.11391
.13.0'88
• .0'4975
• 145.0'1
.23373
.18374
.58558
• 466.0'8
.56781
• 35141
.168.0'2
.29145
• .0955.0'
.34486
.64.0'3..0'
• 34 7.0'9
. 2414.0'.0'
.BlB29

FACTOR

3

.47358
.54526
.54.0'58
.38784
• 4 7.0'9 l
. .0'2248
• 18482
.21798
• .0'7.0'94
• .0'38.0'5
• .0'6869
• .0'6562
• .0'5687
• .0'1637
-.0'.16464
• .0'3644
-.0' • .0'3781
• .0'5299
.13.0'66
.1632.0'
• .0'7537
• 19254
.17.0'36
.11165
• l.0'817
• .0'5581
• ..0'9972
.19565
.13.0'16
• 14553
. .0'4.0'64
• .0'37218
.JU6.0'.0'
• .0'8237
.0863/8
• .0'3158
.17613

.B7BBB

FACTOR
• .9'1823
-.0' • .0'2419
.18396
• .0'38.0'3
-.0'.B2.0'.0'4
-.0' • .0'4891
• .0'.0'64.0'
-.0'.13739
• .0'337.0'
-.0' • .0'3212
• .0'8347
• .0'2746
• .0'9.0'19
• .0'5988
-.0'.22522
-.0' • .0'826.0'
.29558
• .0'.0'534
-.0'.l.0'349
-91. l.0'422
-.0'.913789
• .0'5788
-..0' • ..0'3741
-.0' • .0'5165
• ..0'.0'729
• .0'8663
-B • .0'5868
• 16944
.11271.0'
• .9'9774
-.0'. B.0'/J.0'9
-.0' • ..0'7.0'22
.918828
.182194
-91 • .0'3501
.11.0'19
.12792
-11.15455

4

FACTOR
• .93997
-.0'. l.0'893
-.0' • .0'4361
• .0'3369
-.0' • .0'2633
-.0' • .0'.0'433
• .0'3973
-.0' • .0'3167
• .0'.0'.0'98
• .0'314.0'
-.0' • .0'4955
-.0' • .0'3285
-.0' • .0'3261
-.0' • .0'2779
.12424
• .0'1872
• .0'1411
-.0' • .0'1.0'.0'4
• .0'2528
-.0'.91816.0'
-.0' • .0'158.0'
-.0' • ..0'3295
-.0' • .0'6762
-.0'.l.0'4.0'6
-.0'. l.0'956
-.0'.15517
-.0' • .0'9234
-B • .0'6795
-.0'.142.0'9
.-B.11916
-.0'.15427
-.0' ./8599.0'
-.0' • .0'25.0'9
-91. 11282
-0 • .0'0798
-B.19158
-fl . .0'9622
-B.B8466

2. 38B65

Z.28558

1.72.0'22

1.47612

3.3

3.Z

Z.4

2. l

5
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Table 2

continued

FACTOR
-B • .0'1978
01
• .0'3284
03
• .0'6572
04
07 -B.1624.8'
08 -B • .0'2575
09 -11 • .0'.0'167
01.8' -B • .0'3822
011 -B • .0'2996
012 -B.11645
013 -B • .0'4849
014 -· • .0'6131
• .0'782.8'
015
• .8'7335
016
.59.0'82
017
.12952
018
019 -· • .0'5659
02.9' -· • .8'6993
021 -.8' • .0'6364
022 -·. 16285
023 -· • .0'6674
024 - · • .0'3862
025 -·. l.0'133
026 -· • .0'3358
027
• .0'91 18
028
.B5389
029
.24523
03.0'
• .0'9316
031 -•.0'8281
032 -·. 26628
Q33 -· • .0'3222
034
.63512
035
.21179
036 -· • .0'2624
037
.JJ3622

6 FACTOR
• .0'6658
• .0'15.8'1
• .0'5888
-· • .0'1348
• .0'6513
.138211
• .0'69114
• .0'9393
• .0'71711
.11511
.24188
• .0'2261
• .0'4682
.Bl 6.0'1
• 7 i 295
.45884
-·. 12383
-• • .8'7867
• .0'6211
-.8'.B3BB1
-•.15943
• .0'9767
• .0'4469
-· • .0'24311
• .0'4158
-• • .0'7.0'29
-·. 15344
• .0'4846
-• • .0'5886
.1..0'265
.119547
.289B9
·• .IJ59 l 5
• .IJ1486

7

FACTOR
-·. 172.8'5
• .0'2971
• .0'64.8'9
-B • .0'4347
-B • .0'3747
-B • .0'4363
-ll.B8214
-11 • .0'196.0'
-II .BB.0'75
-l'.17371
-II. 1.0'9.0'8
-II • .0'5878
.63156
• .0'7144
-· • .0'5776
-11.15875
-B • .0'1312
• .0'6668
-B.B2881
.42549
• .0'8.0'65
.35155
.14975
• 44339
• .0'4834
.1326.0'
.48549
-B.289911
-B • .0'2.0'75
-~ • .0'1445
• .0'6.0'38
-II. 17719
-B.17972
-B • .8'7928

8

FACTOR
• .0'6185
• .0'2141
• .0'2 2 1.0'
-B . .0'3.0'5/J
-.0' • .0'616.0'
-B • .0'3.0'36
.B.0'228
• .0'4348
• .0'.0'451
-B • .0'7657
• .0'9714
-B • .0'3895
-.0' • .0'1219
• .0'14.0'1
• .0'712.0'
.13213
• .0'2479
• .0'1564
.19685
-B.l.0'.0'51
-B.12578
-.0' • .0'3664
-B • .0'4793
-B • .0'241.0'
-B.B.0'894
-B • .03536
-B • .0'.0745
• .0'6849
-.0' . .0'3337
• .0'5.0'74
-B . .0'1 766
.111391
-B • .0'19.0'7
• .86348

9

FACTOR 1.0'

FACTOR 1 1

-.0'. l.0'26.0'
-B • .03359
-.0' • .0'5496
• .0'4.0'74
-.0' .B.0'81.0'
-B • .0'4694
-B.B.0'335
-.0' . .0.0'.0'43
-.0' • .0'5631
-.0' • .0'1474
-B • .0'2828
-B . .0'3751
• .0'1898
-B.B2119
• .0'5799
-.0'. l.0'522
• .0'1948
-.0' • .0'8176
-B . .0'6874
-B.11481
-B • .0'8224
-B . .0'4696
• .0'492.0'
.B.0793
• .0'4352
.14262
• .0'5371
• .0'6721
• .0'3172
-B . .0'2296
-.0' • .0'6.0'9.0'
-B • .0'16.43
.11649.0'
-B .114.0'1.0'

-.0'./J.0'24.0'
-B • .0'1219
-.0' • .0'57.0'6
-B • .0'4826
• .02282
• .0.0'882
-.0' • .0'748.0'
• 1.0'2 1.0'
.l.0'786
-.0'.B.0996
• .0'1785
• .0'27.0'4
• .0'2996
• .0'.0'.0'74
• .0'4241
• .0'9513
-.0' • .0'3366
• .0'5256
• .0'2444
• .0'328.0
.l.0'762
• 13.0'68
.flJ773.0'
• 11232
.68.0'34
.4235.0
-B . .06732
• .0'4635
-B.BBB37
• 32468
.l.0'537
-B:.0'3.426
-B • .0'4851
-B • .0'1.0'98

43

Table 2

continued

FACTOR
Q38
Q39
Q4B

au

Q42
Q43

au

Q4S
Q46
047
Q48
Q49
CS/I
QSl
Q52
QS3
QS4

ass

QS6
QS7

ass

C59
Q6/I
Q61
Q62
Q63
Q64
Q65
Q66
Q67
Q68
Q69
Q7.0'
Q71
Q72
Q73
CH
Q75

-•.1151118'

'

-B.B2Sllll

• 128-48
.1711.8'4
.JIS4S6
-B .BU/17

• .0'591S
.113263
-11.111367
-ll.BB/138

-ll • .8'9684
.8'431/1
• .8'9.0'35
-ll.BB951
-ll • .3SB32
-11 • .116657
• .82573
• .81959
.13242
.B3689
.113299
• .8'9138
.1B948
• .88116
-• • .86137
.173S2
./ISSB2
.111879
• .1'66S"2
• l 8S48
.BS893
-11./11827
.1B23S
.B8924
.113.8'SS
• 1/1181
.15.0'4!
.B.8'SS6

PCT OF
VAil

7

-11.11119/IB

-·. 1.Bl 1 7
-ll.B/11142

-11./17387
.1111117
-B.B.0'4.41
-·. 17.497
-ll.3S315
./14369
./12284
-B./19996
-ll.B22Bll
..11. 13/161

.8'4/169
• .112863
• .89623
./19655
-B. 214611
-B.22797

FACTOR

8

.8'1272
.12138
• .9'9412
-ll • .9'4918
-II. 1B67.4
-Jl./11S36
./ISB/17
./IS768
-II .B.0'682
-11. l.0'496
-/I • .0'888'7
-B • .81828'
./118132
-11./11162
-II .llB/123

FACTOR

9

FACTOR 18'

FACTOR 11

-IL 16379

• .0'1672
• .0'.0'1.06
.8287S
-/l.1Sl77
-ll.81S88
-II. 1.0'388
-.0' • .0'S342
• .0'6464
-B.3.0'914
-ll • .0'5917
• .0'5769
-.0' • .0'2235
./846/83
-ll.124SB
-.0' • .0'7495
./874.0'1
• .0'4291
• .0'199.0'
• .0'4243
-.0' • .0'1332
• .0'11 S4
• .0'3672
• .0'7972
.1S943
• .0'829S
-.0'.81338
-B.87978
• .0'7562
• .0'4679
• .0'46.0'.0'
- B ..0'7 1.0' 4
• .0'6212
-.0' • .0'.0'664
-18 • .0'5324
• .0'45.0'7
-18.11356
.188897
-11.111996

• .0'17UJ
• .0'6/1/iil
• .0'8397
./18898
.8339S
./13S38
• .0'3944
• 1218.0'
-S'.117/182
-11./11668
.22487
.63317
.7S.0'B8
-.0' • .0'1156
• .0'77S8
• .81146
.18848
• .0'2615
• 11.0'77
• .0'.0'.0'33
• 2S4.0'6
• .0'661.0'
.1/88711
-B • .0'1486
• .0'S898
-B • .0'5477
.86212
. 12836
-16. l.0'295
• .0'6696
• .0'8624
-.0' • .0'3331
• .0'1331
• .0'11877
• .0.0813
• .0'1417
• 121894
.8'33.0'8

• .0'9374
.89717
.11962
.31278
.817S8
• .0'.0'931
• l.0'683
-B .11.0'2.0'
• .0'.0'43.0'
-.0' ./8363.0'
• .0'6376
.Bl.0'3.0'
./862.0'3
.0'6143
.SB19S
.1937S
.49593
.44267
.22361
-.0' • .0'9215
• .0'811 7
• .0'1123
. .0'5926
-B . .0'.0'826
.85151
.81432
. .0'37.01
.11823
-18 . .0'3758
-.0' . .0'.0'729
. 1.0'8 4 6
-.0' . .0'2Sf.4
-B • .0'2%9
• .0'1785
.1887£4
.14225
.3.0'467

-B • .8'4273
• .8'1882
-11.12737
-B. 1.0'214
-· • .8'S244
-B.JJ6S98
-· • .8'43'9
-11./14763
-11.2/1812
• .0'2S 1.0'
.Bl 191
-ll./172S3
.B14.0'8
-11. l.0'859
-Jl.JJ7538
-B./16284
-11.118348

-B • .83.882
-11./16662
• /l.0'3.85
.12876
.BlS39
• .8'7795
.13237
./11635
.13379
.BS299
.1488.8'
• .8'S782
-• • .198'96
.136.82
.1B493
.12884
• .8'892/1
• .0'4411
./13489
• 14984
./1/1849
.•6BSS
-• • .8'3544

l.35591

1. 22668

1.12579

1 .116636

1 .BB24 l

l.9

1.7

l.i

l.5

J.'

£IGEN-

¥AlUE

FACTOR

-11 • .11221111
-/l • .8'1696

.92546
1.3
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that this factor represents a construct of tidiness in
the work area and company.
Factor 2, a physical stress factor, was defined by
all the physical stress items (items 64,65,66,67,71, and
72) except crowding and shiftwork.

Item 73, warning

signals not heard, which had been proposed as a physical
hazard loaded on this factor also.

This was probably due

to its direct relationship to the physical stressor,
noise.
Factor 3, an anxiety factor, was composed of a
majority of the anxiety items (items 36,37,38,39,40,41,
and 42).

Factor 4, the demographic factor, was composed

of the three demographic items (items 1,3, and 4).
Factor 5, a management control factor, was defined by
several safety management items (items 7,9,13,20, and 22)
and one locus of control item (item 26).

This factor

appears to represent a construct of "safety management in
control of accidents."
Factor 6, a danger level factor, was composed of
three items (items 17,18, and 19) that determine the
extent of injuries in the work area.

Factor 8, also a

danger level factor, was composed of two items (items 16,
and 34) that determine whether or not danger exists at
all.

It appears that the danger level items form two

constructs of danger that are divided according to level
of danger they are measuring.
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Factor 7 was composed of two safety management items
(items 14, and 23), two locus of control items (items 27,
and 30) and one anxiety item (item 45).
basically uninterpretable.

This factor is

Factor 9 was defined by death

of a relative, and death of a close friend which were
both life stress items (items 49, and 50).
Factor 10, shiftwork factor, was composed of one
anxiety item (item 10), three life stress items (items
53,55, and 56) and one physical stress item (item 75).
All of these items concern shiftwork with its associated
impact on stress and anxiety.
Factor 11, a locus of control factor, was composed
of three locus of control items (items 27,28, and 33) and
one anxiety item (item 46).

This factor represents

beliefs about accident control and one anxiety item which
correlates with locus of control.
The response format was agree, do not know, and
disagree throughout the survey with the exception of the
physical hazard and stress checklists for which it was
yes/no.

Therefore, it is unlikely that the results of

the factor analysis were due to any response variance
error.

However, the results could have been affected by

contingency errors.

Items forming an expected factor

were often presented consecutively in the survey thus
inflating the chances of finding these expected factors
in the factor analysis.

If this error was severe,
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Table 3
Reliability Analysis of Survey Factors

Survey Factor

Cronbach's Alpha

#Items

Safety Management

.782

15

Physical Hazards

.746

9

Danger Level

.644

6

Experience

.694

3

Physical Stress

.694

8

Anxiety

.642

10

Life Stress

.504

11

Locus of Control

.335

7
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however, the expected factors would have been more
strongly supported than they were.
The implications of these results for the proposed
model are discussed in the following chapter.
Reliability Analyses
Reliability analyses of the eight scales in the
survey basically produced the expected results {see Table
3).

Values of Cronbach's alpha ranged from .64-.78 for:

safety management, physical hazards, danger level,
experience, physical stressors, and anxiety.

Two items

were removed from the anxiety scale to increase alpha by
.10.

Item 44, "Most people are more afraid of the job

hazards than I am," perhaps should have been stated as "I
am more afraid of the job hazards than most people." In
the original form, the determination of irrational fear
{a symptom of anxiety.) which is the objective of this
item is not accomplished.

A person who is not anxious

could disagree with this statement as easily as a highly
anxious person.

However, with the revised item, it is

more likely that only the highly anxious respondents
could agree.
The second item removed from the anxiety scale to
enhance reliability was item 47, "I am very sure of
myself in new situations." It is likely that this item
tapped a different personality characteristic, such as
self-confidence rather than anxiety.

While it is true
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that anxious people may be very unsure of themselves in
new situations, people who are not generally anxious
could feel the same way.
one item was eliminated from the locus of control
scale to increase alpha by .10.

Upon examination, it was

discovered that the item, "I feel I have been lucky with
regard to accidents," did not differentiate internal from
external locus of control respondents very well.

An

internally oriented employee could agree with this
statement as easily as an externally oriented one.

Even

with this correction, the locus of control scale obtained
a low reliability as did the life stress scale.

This

problem is discussed further in Chapter IV.
In summary, alpha values on the whole were adequate
although they could have been better.

Several items

which were found to be flawed were eliminated.
Correlations between Survey Variables
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to
obtain the interrelationships between all the survey
variables (Table 4).

The correlations were based on

individual level data and were in logical directions.
Safety management, danger level, physical hazards,
physical stressors, anxiety, life stressors and locus of
control were all significantly correlated with each other
except locus of control was not correlated with life
stress.

A manufacturing plant with a good safety

Table 4
Correlation Matrix of the Survey Variables
P E A R S 0 N

SAFETY
SAFETY
ANXIETY

1. Bf4Bf4

(
P=

f4)

•

LOCUS

-{4.3899

432)

. HfiJ.0

• 33JiJ.0
(
432)
P= .JiJJiJ.0

• B'JiJ4 4
(
4JiJ6)
P= .464

-liJ .6JiJ44
(
423)
P= .JiJ.0JiJ

-liJ. 55 lfiJ
(
418)
p.. • .0/iJ.0

-JiJ.1665
(
4 3JiJ)
p = . JiJ.0.0

(

p=

EXP3

HAZLIST

STRESSUW

DANGER.

ANXIETY
-f4.3455
(
432)
P= • .0.0.0

C 0 E F F I C I E NT S

C 0 R R E L AT I 0 N

PSTRESS

-f4.3455
(
432)
P= .BH8

f4)

P=

.2434
(
433)
p = . .0.0.0

-liJ.2339
(
433)
P= .HJUI

-liJ .JiJ46/iJ
(
4flJ7 )
P= .177

.3674
(
424)
p = •JiJ.0.0

.3989
(
419)
P= .liJJiJJiJ

.2494
(
431)
p = . JiJJiJJiJ

DANGER

-8.3899
(
432)
P= .f4BB

.2434
(
433)
P= .f4.0f/J

1 • EJ.0.0.0
(
.0)
P=

-.0.1193
(
433)
p = • .0.06

.JiJ233
(
4JiJ7)
P= • 32JiJ

.4562
(
424)
p = •.0.0JiJ

.43JiJ7
(
419)
P= .8/iJ.0

.1364
(
431)
P= .liJJJ2

LOCUS

.33B.0
(
432)
p = • f4f4.0

-B.2339
(
433)
p = •f4Bf4

-JiJ.1193
(
433)
P= .JiJJiJ6

1 • JiJJiJJiJJiJ
(
JiJ)
P=

.JiJ368
(
4JiJ7)
P= • 23JiJ

-JiJ.1817
(
424)
P= .JiJliJJiJ

-liJ.1663
(
419)
p = . liJJiJJiJ

-fiJ.fiJf474
(
4 31 )
P= • 44f4

• .0.044

-JiJ • .0'46.0
(
4f47 )
P= .177

• .0233
(
4.07)
P= • 32.0

.8'368
(
48'7)
P= .23f4

1 • fiJf4fiJfiJ
(
flJ)
P=

• JiJl 45

(
4.01)
P= .386

-.0.JiJ253
(
396)
P= • 3JiJ8

-JiJ.1127
(
4.0 5 )
P= • .012

• 3674
(
424)
p = •.0.08

(

.4562

(
423)
P= .BB.0

P=

-.lL1817
(
424)
p = • fiJ.0{4

• .0145
(
4/iJl )
P= • 386

1 • .0JiJJiJJiJ
(
liJ)
P=

.659.0
(
417>
P= • .0JiJJiJ

.2395
(
422)
P= .JiJJiJJiJ

-.0.551{4
(
418)
P= • .0.0.0

.3989
(
419>
P= • .0£60

• 43.07
(
419)
p = . fi1f4fi1

-{4. 1663

(
419)
p = • f6fiJf4

-liJ • .0253
(
396)
p.. • 3{48

.659.0
(
417)
p = • f4fiJli1

1 • JiJJiJJiJ.0
(
JiJ)
P=

.2459
(
418)
p . . . JiJJiJJiJ

-.0. 1665
,. 43.0)
P= .BBB

.2494
(
431 )
P= • .000

(

• 1364

-JiJ .f4B74
(
431)
P= .44JiJ

-.0.1127
(
4flJ5 )
P= • .012

.2395

(

422)

P=

• liJJiJf4

.2459
(
418)
P= .JiJJiJJiJ

1 • JiJJiJJiJJiJ
(
JiJ)
P=

EXP3

(
4.06)
P= .464

HAZLIST
PSTRESS
STRESSUW

-B. 6.044

1 • Bf4Bf4
(

424)

.f4JiJJiJ

p=

431)

. .0'.02

(COEFFICIENT I <CASES1 I 1-TAILED SIG>

• IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED

EXP3•experience HAZLIST•physical hazard• PSTRESS•phyaical atreaa
STRESSUW•life stress

so
program, according to these results, would also likely
have low levels of danger, physical hazards, physical
stressors, anxiety, life stress and an internal locus of
control bias.
Age and experience were significantly correlated
with life stress.

The more experienced employees

reported less life stress, perhaps since the commonly
cited stressors included new job assignments, new work
schedules, and less job security.
Correlations of Survey Variables with Accidents
A matrix of Pearson product-moment correlations was
computed to obtain the relationships between the survey
variables with the dependent measures of accident rate.
The correlations were based on group level data and the
obtained correlations were those predicted by the
proposed model (see Table 5).

The log transformation of

accident rates greatly enhanced the obtained
correlations.

Without the transformation, only four

significant correlations were found.

In subsequent

analysis, therefore, the log of accident rates was used
as the the dependent measure.
Safety management, danger level, physical stress,
experience, and locus of control were all significantly
correlated with the log of accident rates for 1985 and
1984 combined.

Accident rates were lower for plants with

good safety management, lower levels of danger and
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Table 5
Correlation Matrix of Survey Variables with Accident Rates

SAFETY

DANGER

ANXIETY

EXP3

PHAZ

PSTRESS

UWSTRESS

LOCUS

LPOOLAR

LAR

POOL AR

AR85
-8.1242
(
79)
P= .138

-iJ.1298
(
79)
P= .127

-8. 239.0'
(

79)
P= • .0'17

-.0'.21.0'8
(
79)
P= . .0'31

(

.. .0'913
79)
P= .212

(

.22.0'8
79)
p .. . .0'25

(

.2293
79)
P= .821

.2855
79)
P= • .0'.0'5

(

.1836
79)
P= • .0'53

(

. .0'317
79)
P= .391

.2481
79)
P= • .0' 14

. .0'991
79)
P= .192

-.0'. 1.0'82
(
78)
P= .173

-.0'. 1.0'9 l
(
78i
P= . 1 71

-8.1984
(
78}
P= .841

-.0'.1936

(

• .0'381
79)
P= .37B

-B.if.0'7.0'
(
79)
P= .475

(

.1245
79)
P= .137

./4295
79)
P= .398

(

. 1825
79)
P= • .0'54

(

. 11148
79)
P= .165

(

. 3271
79)
P= • iJ.0'2

.2161
79)
P= . .0'28

(

. .0'653
79)
P= .284

-8.8898
(
79)
P= .469

• .0'562
79)
P= • 311
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physical stress.

Accident rates were also lower for more

experienced workers and for internal locus of control
individuals.
The use of the log of accident rates for 1985 only
yielded the same results with one additional finding.
Anxiety was significantly correlated with 1985 accidents,
where less anxious departments had fewer accidents.

A

recency effect appeared to be occurring in which anxiety
predicted accidents that were close in time to the
reports of the anxiety.

The 1984-1985 pooled data was

likely to be more reliable with respect to the remainder
of the proposed model, thus the log of 1984-1985 accident
rates was retained for use as a dependent measure.
Subunit Size
Work group size was correlated with the four
measures of accident rate.

A significant positive

correlation (_r-:.21, R<.04, n=79) was found only between
size of the work group and log of accident rate for 1985.
There was no correlation between the log of the pooled
1984-1985 accident rates and work group size.

This lack

of correlation could be attributed to fluctuations in
group size from. 1984 to 1985; only sizes for 1985 could
be obtained for the analysis.
Both linear and curvilinear model components were
tested in the regression analysis.

Size and size-squared

were regressed upon log of accident rate of 1985.

The
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linear effect accounted for 4.1% of the explained
variance in the dependent variable (R<.073) , which
increased to 8.6% when the quadratic was added (R<.033).
Results supported a curvilinear hypothesis.
A scattergram revealed a break-point relationship
which integrated the findings of a linear and a
curvilinear relationship.

Size and accidents were

positively correlated in a linear fashion until a
breakpoint at about 15 people where only large accident
rates occurred.

The distribution for small groups

appeared to be bimodal, with a lower mode at accident
rate=O.OO, and an upper mode at accident rate=0.90-2.23.
When size became greater than 15 people, the distribution
at accident rate=0.00 disappeared and only the higher
accident rate distribution remained.
Path Analysis
A path analysis consisting basically of two multiple
regressions was conducted to test the model.

The forced

entry method of multiple regression was used since this
is the appropriate method for testing models (Cohen &
Cohen, 1975).

The first multiple regression used

accident rate as the dependent variable.

The independent

variables which were proposed to relate directly to
accident rate were entered at the group level in the
following order:

safety management, danger level,

experience, anxiety, and physical hazards.

When
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regressed upon the log of accident rates for 1985 only,
the variables were found to account for 15.7% of the
variance which was significant at the R<.05 level (see
Table 6).

When the variables were regressed upon the log

of accident rates for 1984 and 1985 combined, the
variance accounted for was 15.3% which was significant at
the R<.005 level (see Table 7).
The second regression in the path analysis used
anxiety as the dependent variable with independent
variables at the individual level entered in this order:
physical stress, life stress, and locus of control.

The

independent variables accounted for 21.4% of the variance
in anxiety, and this was significant at the R<.001 level
(Table 8).
Overall Regression
The overall regresssion revealed a direct path from
physical stress to accident rates that was not included
in the original model.

When physical stress was entered

into the regression of safety management, physical
hazards, anxiety, experience, and danger level, the
explained variance of accident rate increased from 15.7%
to 20.6% when accident rate for 1985 only was the
dependent variable (see Table 6).

When physical stress

was entered into the regression of the variables proposed
to directly relate to accident rate for 1984 and 1985
combined, the explained variance increased from 15.3% to
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Table 6
Path Analysis and Overall Regression Using 1985 Accident Rates

direct
relationshiJ2
Variable

F(model) t(last step)

R

R2

Adjusted R2

Safety Management

... 655

.239 .057

.045

Danger Level

1.625

.275 .075

.058

-1.285

.337 .113

.078

1.001

.370 .136

.090

-2.054

.397 .157

.099

2.005

.454 .206

.139

.078

.454 .206

.127

.093

.454 .206

.114

Experience
Anxiety
Physical Hazards

2.695*

direct and indirect
relationshiE
Physical Stress
indirect
relationshi;e
Life Stress
Locus of Control
p*<.05

2.241*
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Table 7
Path Analysis and overall Regression Using 1984 and 1985
Accident Rates

direct
relationshie
Variable

F(model) t(last stee>

Safety Management

~

R2

Adjusted R2

-1.195

.211 .045

.032

3.031

.300 .090

•. 066

Experience

-1.237

.358 .128

.093

Anxiety

-0.049

.358 .120

.DBl

-2.964

.456 .208

.153

l.270

.485 .235

.l 71

l.178

.501 .251

.l 76

.sos

.169

Danger Level

Physical Hazards

3.787**

indirect and direct
relationshie
Physical Stress
indirect
relationshiI?
Life Stress
Locus of Control
p*fl<.005
p-ac::. 01

2.956*

-0.646

.255
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Table 8
Path Analysis with Anxiety as Dependent Variable

Variable

F(model) t(last step)

R

Physical Stress

7.193

.399

.160

Life Stress

3.722

.428

.183

37.632*** -4.030

.463

.214

Locus of Control

p ***<.001
.
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23.5% (see Table 7).

It appears that the model was

correct in that it proposed physical stress to affect
accident rate through its effect on anxiety but lacking
in that it proposed no direct effect.
Life stress and locus of control affected accidents
only indirectly.

When they were directly regressed upon

accident rate for 1985, they did not account for any
additional explained variance.

When they were directly

regressed upon accident rate 1984 and 1985, it appeared
that they accounted for an additional 2% variance.
However, the adjusted R coefficients (Table 7) indicated
that the increase in variance accounted for was due to
the increase in number of predictors.
In summary, the path analysis fully supported the
model and the overall regression supported the addition
of one more path (see Figures 2 and 3).
revision of the model was in order.

A slight

It was necessary to

add the direct path from physical stress to accident rate
to the model.
Cross-validation
The path analysis was cross-validated in two ways.
In the first cross-validation, subsamples consisted of
randomly selected companies.

In the second

cross-validation, subsamples consisted of randomly
selected work groups.

The company cross-validation was

conducted by dividing the sample into two parts, one

SAFETY
MANAGEMENT

-.24

-.20

EXPERIENCE .......~........"

ANXIETY
LIFE STRESS

R=.463

.25

LOG OF
1985
ACCIDENT
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DANGER LEVEL

.23

PHYSICAL HAZARDS

Figure

!•

Results of the path analysis using 1985 accident rates.

EXPERIENCE
PHYSICAL STRESS
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.10
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Results of the path analysis using 1984-1985 accident rates.
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consisting of six companies and the other of three
companies.

Companies were left intact in order to test

the generalizability of the model from one company to the
next.

Cross-validations were conducted using both the

five variable and the six variable models of factors
directly related to accident rate.

Weights obtained from

repeating all regression analyses on the larger part of
the sample resulted in the following equations for the
five variable model:
(1) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.006637*Safety
Management)+(0.026993*Danger Level)-(0.065958*
Experience)+(0.060672*Anxiety)-(0.008451*
Physical Hazards)+l.203895
(2) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.0453830*
Safety Management)+(0.13476l*Danger Level)
-(0.030593*Experience)+(0.023712*Anxiety)
-(0.17.1868*Physical Hazard)+l.848447.
The following equations resulted for the six
variable model:
(3) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.001390*Safety
Management)+(0.024425*Danger Level)-(0.052176*
Experience)+(0.037657*Anxiety)-(0.066831*
Physical Hazard)+(0.138322*Physical
Stress)+0.819017.
(4) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.040627*
Safety Management)+(0.132442*Danger Level)
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-(0.018152*Experience)+(0.002935*Anxiety)(0.224570*Physical Hazard+(0.124870*
Physical Stress)+l.501000.
The following equation resulted for anxiety:
(5) Anxiety=(0.613209*Physical Stress)+(0.197050*
Life Stress)-(0.285310*Locus of Control)+5.150613.
Each of these equations held up under
cross-validation (see Table 9).

Even under

cross-validation, the six variable model was better than
the five variable model originally proposed.

For the six

variable model, R increased from .454 to .468 using log
accident rate of 1985 as the dependent measure, and from
.485 to .577 using log accident rate of 1984-1985.

The

five variable model was not as predictive, although still
significant.

The coefficient of multiple correlation for

log accident rate 1985 decreased slightly from .397 to
.392, but increased for log accident rate 1984-1985 from
.456 to .551.

The cross-validations demonstrated that

the equations as predicted by the theoretical model were
stable across samples of organizations.

An increase in

upon cross-validation is not a usual occurrence.

In this

particular sample, each company was likely to have
contributed situational variability to the relationship
between survey variables and accident rates.

This

variability was probably reduced when the sample was
divided into two parts for the cross-validation.

~
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Table 9
Cross-valid~tions

of the Path Analysis

Sample divided into two subsamples of intact companies.
Dependent Variable•l985 Accident
Equation

~

R

.!'.!!!!.

Sample

!.!.!!.!

R

Validation Sample

r

cross-validation

(1)

var~able

.397

.311

.392*

(3)

var~able

.454

.364

.468 **

( 2)

Dependent Variable•,!lli .!!!£ ~ Accident ~
5
.427
variable
.456
.551 ***

(4)

variable

6

.485

.577***

.471

Sample divided into-two subsamples of work groups.

Cl)
(3)

(2)
(4)

Dependent Variable·~ Accident ~
5
variable
.397
.482
6
variable
.205
.512
De];!endent Variable•.ll!!i
5
variable
.456
6
variable
.485

~ ~

Accident

.064
.205

!..!!.!.!

.510

.218

.536

.219

Sample divided into two subsamples of individuals.
Dependen.t Variable•Anxiety

(5)

3

variable

p *<.os

p **<.01
p ***<.oos
p **** <·OOl

.463

.472

.426 ****
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To investigate this explanation, another
cross-validation was performed.

This time individual

work groups rather than intact companies were randomly
selected and assigned to one of the two subsamples.

The

work group cross-validation consisted of dividing the
sample into a subsample of 26 groups and a subsample of
53 groups.

cross-validations were conducted using both

the five variable and the six variable models of factors
directly related to accident rate.

Weights obtained from

repeating all regression analyses on the larger part of
the sample resulted in the following equations for the
five varible model:
(1) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.052489*Safety
Management)+(0.113233*Danger Level)-(0.045814*
Experience)+(0.036927*Anxiety)
-(0.124982*Physical Hazards)+l.203895
(2) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.074356*Safety
Management)+(0.13476l*Danger Level)-(0.031400*
Experience)+(0.005215*Anxiety)
-(0.162788*Physical Hazards)+2.61244.
The following equations resulted for the six
variable model:
(3) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.036950*Safety
Management)+(0.095552*Danger Level)-(0.043801*
Experience)+(0.020362*Anxiety)-(0.161289*
Physical Hazards)+(0.144439*Physical
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Stress)+l.249063
(4) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.06186*Safety
Managemerit)+(0.085540*Danger Level)-(0.029777*
Experience)+(O.Ol8572*Anxiety)-(0.192065*
Physical Hazards)+(0.111647*Physical
Stress)+2.208386.
These equations did not hold up under
cross-validation (see Table 9) •

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

This final chapter begins with a discussion of the
important findings in this study with emphasis on the
theoretical relevance,

A section on the limitations of

the study including reliability, and internal and
external validity follows.

The chapter and dissertation

ends with sections on the practical implications of the
study and plans for future research.
Important Findings and Their Theoretical
Relevance
Correlations.

The variables in the model were found

to be significantly intercorrelated in the directions
that the model predicted.

Plants which reported poorer

safety management programs also reported higher levels of
danger, physical hazards, physical stressors, and higher
levels of anxiety, life stress and an external locus of
control bias.

The more experienced workers reported less

life stress to a significant degree probably due to less
reports of the common stressors such as new job
assignments, new work schedules, and less job security.
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Anxiety was found to correlate with life stress and locus
of control but life stress and locus of control did not
correlate with each other.
It is understandable that physical hazards, physical
stressors, danger level, and safety management, were all
interrelated because they were environmental
characteristics of the same work place.

Also, all were

hypothesized to affect accident rates directly.

It

follows that anxiety, which was partially attributable to
physical stressors and related directly to accident rate,
was correlated with all the variables with which physical
stress was correlated.

According to the hypotheses, life

stress and external locus of control orientation should
lead to anxiety, and so it is appropriate that these two
variables were significantly correlated with all the
variables with which anxiety was correlated.

Life stress

and locus of control, however, were thought to be
independent of each other.

Thus, the lack of correlation

between them was consistent with the model.
Secondly, the variables in the model were also
significantly correlated with the dependent variables,
log of accident rates for 1985 and log of accident rates
for 1984-1985.

Safety management, danger level, physical

stress, experience, locus of control, and anxiety were
all correlated with accident rates.

Plants which

reported poorer safety management, higher danger level,
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high physical stress, less job experience, or an external
locus of control bias had higher accident rates.

The

anxiety correlation was found only for 1985 accident
rates.

It appears that anxiety can predict accidents

only if accidents and anxiety are measured at proximal
times.

This finding is logical since anxiety is often a

temporary condition rather than a stable trait.

Life

stress which was found to be a predictor of anxiety was
measured in the most recent 6 months, so it is logical
that anxiety resulting from life stress would only be
related to accidents during the same limited time period.
The results of the correlations between survey
variables and accident rates basically supported the
hypotheses.

One exception was that physical hazards were

not found to correlate with accidents.

Further

discussion of this finding can be found under
limitations.
Regressions.

It was previously mentioned that one

objective of this research was to expand the present
theory about accidents.

The organizational climate

literature has focused on safety management issues.

This

study demonstrated that although safety management is a
significant variable in accidents, other variables should
also be included.
There is already adequate support for the predictive
validity that experience, danger level, and physical
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hazards contribute to any model of accidents.
corroborated these findings.

This study

Previous research supported

the hypothesis that anxiety directly affects accident
rate but studies were post-dictive in nature.

This study

supplied concurrent validity for the anxiety-accident
relationship.
The path analysis conducted on the proposed model
produced results that strongly supported the model.
Safety management, danger level, physical hazards,
experience, and anxiety accounted for a significant
proportion of the accident rate variance.
Previous research also supported the stress, locus
of control, and anxiety relationship.

High stress

directly increases anxiety, and locus of control
moderates this effect with internals being less anxious.
This study measured these variables in an industrial
setting along with the more "typical accident" variables
of safety management, physical hazards, danger level, and
experience.

Physical stress, life stress, and locus of ·

control were found to be significant predictors of
anxiety as previous research suggested.

Locus of control

and life stress affected accidents through anxiety only.
Physical stress, however, had an indirect as well as a
direct effect on accidents.
Upon conducting an overall regression on the
variables in the model, a finding not previously included
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in the model was discovered.

Physical stress correlated

with accidents indirectly through anxiety as proposed,
but also correlated directly with accidents, which was
not originally proposed.

When the model was revised to

include the new finding, proportion of criterion variance
accounted for was increased 3-5%.
finding is quite logical.

Upon examination, this

Physical stress not only

causes error by causing more anxiety but physical stress
itself can cause error.
physic~!

For example, noise which is a

stressor can increase anxiety thus increasing

chance for error.

Noise can also mask a warning signal

thereby causing a person to miss the chance to avoid the
hazard because the person does not even realize the
hazard exists.
Uncontrollable physical stress and its effect on
error has been explained in various ways.

According to

adaptive-cost hypothesis, stress drains a person's energy
due to the extra effort required to maintain the same
performance level.

It takes more energy to do the same

job in extreme heat so a person becomes tired, makes an
error, and an accident results.

According to information

overload hypothesis, dealing with stress saps channel
capacity.

Since safety is often given secondary task

status, errors of that type become more likely.
Actually, the two hypotheses are quite similar.
Learned helplessness theory predicts that
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individuals lose the motivation to lessen the physical
stress they are experiencing because past experience has
demonstrated ·their actions to be futile.

This lack of

motivation extends to both the primary and secondary
tasks, and inevitably an accident results.

The theories

were not tested in this study but are included merely to
provide a rationale for the physical stress-accident
finding.

The theory supported by this study is that

uncontrollable stressors in occupational settings affect
accidents directly by creating a hazardous environment
and/or affect accidents indirectly by increasing anxiety
which leads to error.
The model held up strongly under cross-validation
when the sample was divided into two subsamples of intact
companies.

Cross-validation coefficients actually

increased rather than decreasing as they typically do in
cross-validations studies as a result of the decrease in
sample size necessary to conduct the analysis.

This

study was unique, however, in the sense that results in
the path analysis were based on collapsing data across
nine distinct companies with.their particular
characteristics.

Therefore, when the sample was divided

for the cross-validation, the randomizing effects of
these characteristics probably decreased and Bs
increased.
Evidence for this was provided by, the second
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cross-validation in which the sample was divided into two
subsamples of individual work groups rather than intact
companies.

In this situation, cross-validation did not

hold up as it did for randomly selected companies.
Subunit Size.

Analyses of subunit size added to the

theoretical debate over its relationship to accidents.
Smaller groups were found to have less accidents than
larger groups on the whole.

small groups, less than 15

members, were bimodally distributed with one group at

o.o

accident rate and the other in a higher accidPnt range.
At the point where number of members is greater than 15,
this

o.o mode disappeared and only the higher accident

rate mode remained.

This helped to explain the previous

research findings of both a positively correlated linear
relationship and a curvilinear relationship between size
and accidents.
Limitations of the Study
Reliability.

The reliability analysis of the eight

scales contained in the survey produced adequate results.
Cronbach's alphas were in the .64-.78 range for safety
management, physical hazards, danger level, experience,
physical stressors, and anxiety.

The alpha obtained for

locus of control was lower than expected (.34).
for life stress was lower than expected (.50).

Alpha
One item

was removed from the anxiety and two from the locus of
control scales.

These items were not found to
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discriminate as they should have.
The lower reliability of the locus of control scale
was believed to be partially due to the nature of the
sample.

Volunteer industrial subjects have been found to

have a more internal locus of control than university
students on whom research on the scale is based (Sims et
al., 1984).

The manufacturing sample used in this study

was compared to the student sample used in pilot work.
The university students obtained a mean of 8.2 (s=3.63)
on the locus of control scale while the manufacturing
sample obtained a significantly higher mean of

a.a

(s=2.59, t=-2.37, R<.05).

Internally oriented employees could have
participated in the survey because they believed that
through their participation they would have an impact on
the work environment..

Perhaps internal locus of control

individuals simply were not afraid to participate and
external locus of control individuals were.

Internal

locus of control workers would be more likely to feel
that the consequences of their participation were in
their control.

Whatever the reason for the internal

locus of control bias, it is apparent that the bias could
have severely restricted the range of responses to the
locus of control items.

This restriction in range could

be a contributor to the unreliability of the scale.

The

bias also may have attenuated the anxiety and locus of
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control effects due to restricted range.
on the life stress scale, several of the items, such
as death of a spouse, death of a friend, and new job
assignments, were rarely reported.

The restriction in

range of responses for these items could be responsible
for the lower reliability of the scale.
The implications of the low reliabilities of the
anxiety, life stress, and locus of control scales are
obvious.

Decreased reliability leads to decreased

construct validity.

The impact of these variables on

each other and on accident rates is likely to have been
underestimated in this study.
Internal Validity.

The scales for experience,

physical stress, and anxiety factored as expected.
danger level scale formed two scales.

The

The first scale

was comprised of items that established whether any
hazard existed.

The second scale was comprised of items

that assessed the higher levels of danger.

It is

apparent that there may be a problem with the construct
validity of the other factors.

Only three locus of

control items loaded on the locus of control scale.
Safety management items were divided into two constructs;
one was management in control factor and the other
combined with physical hazard items as a messiness
factor.

There appeared to be a shiftwork construct

consisting of life stress items with shiftwork.

No life
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stress factor was extracted.
The low correlation of the locus of control scale
used in the study and Rotter's locus of control scale
suggests that the locus of control construct used in the
survey should be renamed to belief about accident
control.

The low correlation, although significant, also

indicates that belief about accident control is
independent of Rotter's scale.

However, the same

hypotheses are made about the relationship of belief
about accident control to accidents as those made for
locus of control.
It appears that there is more than one way for the
various items in the survey to combine.
is easy to propose distinct factors.

In a survey it

In an applied

environment, however, items from various sources blend
together in some cases to form an unexpected factor.

In

this study, for example, physical hazards items blended
with safety management items to form a messiness factor.
It appears that the fundamentals of the proposed model
are accurate, but the model may be more complicated than
originally proposed.
If the problems with the construct in the survey are
not eliminated, the internal validity of the study is in
question.

One cannot be confident that the obtained

results truly support the proposed model since
measurement of the independent variables may have been
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flawed.
External Validity.

As previously mentioned, there

may be a response bias present in the study.

The sample

on the average had a high internal locus of control
score,
indicating respondents tended to be more

internally oriented than non-respondents.

It is

possible, therefore, that the results obtained from this
sample are applicable only for individuals with an
internal locus of control {a belief that they can control
accidents) •

The data for non-respondent!l;l'. could change

"·

the obtained results dramatically if it were in fact true
that the survey constructs interrelated differently for
an external belief sample.

One solution for this problem

would be to make participation in the survey mandatory as
a safety precaution.
It was mentioned that physical hazards did not
correlate with accidents as expected.

This could be due

to 23% of respondents answering that no hazards existed
in their work environment.

The skewed distribution could

be responsible for lowered correlations between the
hazard checklist and accidents.

Also, the fact that

there was a very high negative correlation between safety
and physical hazards suggests that· a good safety program
may limit the number of accidents due to physical
hazards.
In both of these cases, the external validity of the
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study is threatened.

In the first case, a response bias

may invalidate the use of survey variables to predict
accident rates.

Since accident rates were based on the

entire sample, any measures used to predict accident
rates should be representitive of the entire sample.

The

potential response bias indicates that the data obtained
from the survey may not have been truly representitive of
the sample.

In the second case, the lack of correlation

between physical hazard and accidents may have resulted
from the skewed distribution of the hazard checklist.
Multiple regression requires that independent variables
be normally distributed so this violation may have
resulted in an underestimate of the true contribution of
physical hazards to accidents.
Although the regression models were supported by the
cross-validation at the company level, cross-validation
at the work group level was not supported thus limiting
the external validity of the path model.

The regression

models can be generalized to new companies with
confidence, but, generalization to specific work groups
outside the validation sample should be attempted with
caution.
Practical Implications
The data obtained from this survey can be used to
build a causal model of human error related accidents
that can be applied to occupational settings.

All the

78

survey variables can be measured and used to pinpoint
problem areas in a particular company.

For example, if

poor safety management is found to be responsible for a
large percentage of variance in accident rate for a
particular foundry, a program for improved safety
management can be introduced.

or, if life stress is

found to be a particular problem in a company, a
counseling program could be installed.

Solutions could

be at the individual or organizational level depending on
the problem and so the appropriate type of consultant
should be contacted (i.e., clinical or organizational).
Future Research
Accident rates for the work groups in the sample
will be collected for October 1985-0ctober 1986.

The

analyses conducted with the dependent variables in this
study will then be repeated using these rates as the
dependent variable so that predictive validity in
addition to concurrent validity can be established.
The nonlinear relationship found between
organizational subunit size and accident rates is worthy
of further investigation.

Future research plans include

analysis of the interdependencies among task type,
organization, survey variables and subunit size.

This

analysis would hopefully explain the origins of the
nonlinear relationship.
Another future research objective is to revise the
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survey.

The life stress and locus of control scales can

be improved as already mentioned.

The life stress scale

will be revised to include more commonly occurring items.
Instead of death of a spouse, or death of a friend which
received few positive responses, other items from the
Ruch and Holmes (1971) stress scale will be included
(e.g., mortgage over $10,000; minor violations of the law
will be represented by the statement "I usually drive
5-10 miles over the speed limit").
Three things will be done to improve the locus of
control scale, which will be renamed belief about
accident control.

First, more items will be pilot tested

with an industrial sample rather than a student sample as
used for the pilot test of this study.

The purpose of

the pilot test will be to find more items that
significantly correlate with Rotter's (1966) scale.
Secondly, a forced choice format will be developed
similar to Rotter's method.

Hopefully, this will improve

the reliability of the scale.

The forced choice response

mode was avoided in this study due to its potential for
complicating the survey and confusing respondents.
Lastly, an incentive system for persuading individuals
with an external belief orientation to respond to the
survey will be developed.

If these individuals

participate in the study, the belief scale will be
improved, and the response bias along with its negative
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implications for validity will be eliminated.
The physical hazard checklist did not correlate with
the dependent variables as it was expected to.

As

mentioned, 24% of reports were that no hazards from the
checklist existed.

If the hazard checklist was compared

across several industries including more hazardous
environments such as mining, the chance of finding a
correlation would be improved.
The factor analysis extracted some unexpected
factors of shiftwork, safety management control of
accidents, and a messiness factor.

In this one study, it

is difficult to determine whether these factors were a
function of the metal industry studied or were enduring
constructs of the survey.

To further investigate the

model, another future plan involving this research is to
conduct the revised survey across several industries such
as mining, chemical, and agricultural.

Results of this

extended analyses will uncover useful information about
the appropriate factor structure, as it is now unknown
whether the new factors obtained in this study should be
ignored, used in substitution of factors originally
proposed, or used in combination with the original
factors.

If the results of the factor analysis obtained

in this study receive further support, future research
plans will include building a model based on these
factors.
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In the very long run, the model can be extended and
research conducted on accidents other than occupational
types.

Automobile accidents, a definite problem in the

United States, could possibly be decreased due to
knowledge gained by applying this model.
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